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Others in this Symposium are, quite rightly,  celebrating the accom-
plishments  of  environmental  law  during  the  past  twenty-five  years:
There is certainly much to applaud.  In relatively few years this country
has adopted a vast array of environmental protection  programs set forth
in hundreds  of pages of statutes and thousands of pages of regulations.
These ambitious  programs  have left few  areas of the law untouched  in
their persistent effort to limit activities that damage the natural environ-
ment.  Environmental  lawyers  must cope not  only  with the regulatory
morass presented  by the environmental  protection  laws themselves,  but
must  frequently  become  enmeshed  in  issues  of  bankruptcy,  constitu-
tional, corporate, insurance, international trade, and securities law.  Like
environmental  law,  other areas  of law  have  steadily  evolved  as  public
demand for increased environmental protection has required the striking
of new balances between  competing social policies.  The resulting jungle
of overlapping legal rules and contexts is enough to make environmental
lawyers  today  nostalgic for the "wilderness  of administrative  law"  that
greeted those pioneering environmental  lawyers of the early  1970s. 1
While not wishing to detract from the deserved celebration  of envi-
ronmental  law, the focus of this Essay is decidedly different.  It seeks to
understand  environmental  law  better  by  examining  an  area  of law  in
which  the process  of assimilating environmental  protection  values  into
rules of law has recently proven most difficult-criminal law.  To be sure,
in no area of the law has the assimilation process been easy.  Legal rules,
by their very nature, resist change because change itself undermines  the
value of having a rule in the first instance.  Yet the jump from the civil to
*  Professor of Law, Washington University (St. Louis).  I would like to thank Kathleen
Brickey  for her  helpful  comments  on  an  earlier  draft.  Unlike  me,  Professor  Brickey  is  an
expert on corporate  criminal law.  Remaining  errors are the result of my stubbornness  rather
than her oversight.
1. See  David Sive, Some  Thoughts of an Environmental  Lawyer in the  Wilderness of  Ad-
ministrative  Law, 70  COLUM.  L. REv.  612  (1970).LOYOLA  OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the  criminal  arena  has  been  especially  problematic  for  environmental
protection,  and promises  to continue to be so.
It  is, however,  the very  existence  of such conflict  that makes  the
topic so academically promising.  This is so in two discrete ways.  First,
conflict  is often more revealing  than obscuring.  Conflict exposes  differ-
ences,  often  by  their  exaggeration.  Hence,  analysis  of  the  causes  of
contentiousness  that have arisen recently  in environmental  criminal  en-
forcement reveals problems affecting  environmental protection  law rele-
vant  far  beyond  the  peculiar  issue  of  environmental  crime.  Second,
conflict  suggests the need for reform and therefore  its careful study pro-
vides an occasion to recommend ways  around the current impasse in the
assimilation  process.
To  these ends,  this Essay  is  divided  into three  parts.  First, it de-
scribes  the problems  that currently  threaten  to  overwhelm  the federal
government's  environmental  criminal  enforcement  program.  Following
presentation  of some background material, this discussion focuses princi-
pally  on  investigations  of recent  allegations  of governmental  incompe-
tence  and  malfeasance  in  the  administration  of  its  environmental
criminal enforcement  program.  Second, it seeks to explain the causes of
these problems, with a heavy emphasis on how those causes both fit into
a  broader historical  context  and relate  to the sweeping  way  in which
Congress  has  defined  crimes  in federal  environmental  protection  laws.
Finally,  this Essay  offers  some tentative  recommendations  for breaking
the existing  impasse  that plagues  the  environmental  criminal  enforce-
ment effort.
I.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIMES  CONTROVERSY
Until relatively recently,  the enforcement  of environmental protec-
tion  laws meant, without  more, their civil enforcement.  Although,  his-
torically,  there certainly have been instances of criminal prosecutions  in
which the defendant's  unlawful acts included  environmental  pollution,2
there was no systematic  effort by either federal or state governments  to
2.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Alaska S. Packing  Co. (In re La Merced),  84 F.2d 444 (9th
Cir. 1936) (allowing prosecution  for water pollution  from oil discharge into lake);  Seacord v.
Illinois,  13  N.E.  194 (Ill.  1887)  (allowing prosecution  for  air pollution  from  hog  rendering
tanks);  State  v.  Taylor,  29  Ind.  517  (1868)  (allowing  prosecution  for water  pollution  from
urinating into public spring); State  v. Buckman,  8 N.H. 203  (1836)  (allowing prosecution for
water pollution from dumping of animal  carcass into drinking well); Commonwealth  v. Yost,
11  Pa. Super.  323 (1899)  (allowing prosecution  for water pollution  from privy upstream  from
water company), rev'd,  197  Pa.  171 (1900).  See generally CHRISTOPHER HARRIS  ET AL.,  EN-
VIRONMENTAL  CRIMES  ch.  1 (1992)  (discussing  prosecution  of pollution-related  offenses in
nineteenth century).
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utilize  criminal  sanctions  on behalf of environmental  protection  goals.
Although Congress routinely included  criminal  sanctions in each of the
major environmental laws that it has enacted since the 1970s,3 the federal
environmental  criminal  enforcement  program  remained  largely  mori-
bund prior to the mid-1980s.
Federal  litigation  resources  were  principally  devoted  to  defending
the executive branch's implementation of its huge statutory responsibili-
ties  as the regulated  community,  affected  states, and the environmental
community consistently challenged agency programs in court.4  Because
of their  inherently  discretionary  nature,  enforcement  efforts  typically
took a backseat to defensive litigation, to which the federal government
had no choice but to respond.  When, moreover, the federal government
did initiate  enforcement  actions,  these  actions  were  almost  exclusively
civil in character.
In the mid- to late  1970s, the Department of Justice (Department)
undertook a few publicized prosecutions for violations of environmental
protection  laws  in order to establish  at least the threat  of criminal  en-
forcement.'  Several years later, the Department commenced a program-
matic effort  within what  was then the Department's Land  and Natural
Resources Division, now the Environment and Natural  Resources Divi-
sion (Environment Division).  The Department did so by creating an En-
vironmental  Crimes  Unit  (now  a  Section)  within  the  Environment
Division, which  would be  concerned exclusively  with criminal  prosecu-
tions arising under the federal environmental  protection laws.'  The En-
vironment Division  intended lawyers  within that Section to possess the
expertise in environmental law necessary both to prosecute environmen-
3. See, e.g.,  Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136j (1988  &
Supp. IV  1992); Toxic Substances Control  Act,  15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1988  & Supp. IV  1992);
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (West  1986 & Supp. 1993);  Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (Supp. IV  1993); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§  300h-
2, 300i-1  (1988);  Resource Conservation  and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)-(e)
(West  1983);  Clean Air Act, 42  U.S.C. § 7413(c) (Supp. III  1991);  Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response,  Compensation,  and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b),  (d) (1988).
4.  See  Robert  Glicksman  & Christopher  H.  Schroeder,  EPA and the Courts:  Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, LAW  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Autumn  1991,  at 249,  256-76.
5.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Ashland  Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d  1317 (6th Cir.  1974);
United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa.  1978), a f'd, 602 F.2d 1123  (3d Cir.
1979),  cerL denied, 464 U.S.  829 (1983);  United States v. Phelps  Dodge Corp.,  391 F. Supp.
1181  (D. Ariz.  1975).  See generally Judson W.  Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA:
The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the  Work  that Remains, 59  GEO.
WASH.  L. REV.  900, 905-06  (1991)  (discussing prosecution of particularly egregious  conduct
involving discharge of pollutants  in violation of Clean  Water Act).
6.  Joseph G. Block, Environmental  Criminal  Enforcement in the 1990's, 3 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 33,  34 (1992);  Starr, supra note 5, at 910.
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tal cases themselves and to assist federal prosecutors in the offices  of the
United  States Attorney  interested in such cases.
At the behest of the Environmental  Protection Agency  (EPA) and
the Department, Congress also took a series of deliberate steps designed
to promote environmental  criminal  prosecutions.  Congress  added  new
environmental  crimes to existing statutes7  and significantly increased the
criminal  penalties associated with the violation of federal environmental
statutes,8 partly to send the message to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion  (FBI) as  well  as to  the regulated  communities that environmental
crimes  were  now a priority for federal  law enforcement.  Congress  also
conferred new investigatory authorities on the EPA and substantially in-
creased the EPA's related resources for the specific purpose of enhancing
the federal criminal prosecution effort.9
There have apparently been concrete results.  According to the De-
partment, between fiscal years  1983  and  1993,  the Department  "has  re-
corded environmental  criminal indictments against 911 corporations  and
individuals,  and 686 guilty pleas and convictions  have been entered.  A
total of $212,408,903 in criminal penalties has been assessed.  More than
388 years of imprisonment have been imposed of which nearly  191 years
account for actual confinement." 10
In  1983  the EPA had only twenty-three  criminal  investigators.  By
1990 the EPA's criminal enforcement program had increased to 110 peo-
ple, including forty-seven special agents.Ii  Under the Pollution Prosecu-
tion Act, which Congress enacted in  1990, the number of special  agents
is supposed  to  quadruple by  1995.12  Similar increases  in personnel  are
7. See,  e.g.,  Water  Quality Act  of  1987,  § 312,  Pub.  L. No.  100-4,  101  Stat.  7, 42-45
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988));  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976,  § 3007,  Pub.  L.  No.  94-580,  90  Stat.  2795  (codified  as  amended  at  42  U.S.C.A.
§ 6927(b)(2) (West  1983)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.  101-549,  §§  101,
113(c)(5),  104 Stat. 2399,  2675-77 (codified at 42 U.S.C.  §§ 7407(d), 7413).
8.  See,  e.g.,  Water Quality Act  of 1987, § 312,  101  Stat. at 42-45;  The Hazardous and
Solid Waste  Act  Amendments  of 1984,  § 232,  Pub.  L. No.  98-616,  98  Stat.  3221,  3256-57
(codified  as  amended  at  42  U.S.C.  § 6928  (1988));  Clean  Air Act  Amendments  of  1990,
§§  101,  133(c),  104 Stat. at 2675-77.
9.  See  Pollution  Prosecution  Act  of 1990,  §§  201-205,  Pub.  L.  No.  101-593,  104  Stat.
2954, 2962-63  (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321  (Supp. IV  1992)).
10.  Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins,  Paralegal, U.S. Department of Justice, to Neil S.
Cartusciello,  Chief,  Environmental  Crimes  Section,  U.S.  Department  of Justice  (May  27,
1992)  (on  file  with  Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); see also OFFICE OF  CRIMINAL  EN-
FORCEMENT,  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION  AGENCY,  ENFORCEMENT  ACCOMPLISHMENTS
REPORT:  FISCAL YEAR  1990,  at 3-2  (1991)  (offering  statistics of  environmental criminal  en-
forcement  for fiscal years  1982 through  1990).
11.  James  M.  Strock,  Environmental Criminal Enforcement Priorities  for the 1990s, 59
GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV.  916,  918  (1991).
12.  Pollution  Prosecution  Act of  1990,  § 202(a),  104  Stat. at 2962.
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evident at  the Department.  There  were  three lawyers  in  the Environ-
mental Crimes Unit when it commenced operations in 1983.13  Currently
there are approximately thirty-one lawyers  in that Section,  all of whom
devote their time exclusively to the criminal enforcement of environmen-
tal laws. 4  Several  United  States  Attorneys'  offices  across  the country
now also include at least one federal criminal prosecutor who spends all
or a substantial  portion of his or her time exclusively  on environmental
protection  matters. 15
Finally, the FBI has been devoting increasing resources to environ-
mental criminal prosecutions.  The number of cases on which FBI special
agents worked increased from thirty-six to 450 between  1984 and 1992.16
In  1991  FBI special  agents  devoted  more than  143,000 work  hours to
environmental  crimes  investigations.7
Such  statistics would  appear to suggest both past achievement  and
future  promise.  The  federal  environmental  criminal  enforcement  pro-
gram,  however, is currently  in utter disarray  amidst a flurry of accusa-
tions and counteraccusations  between the regulated community and the
Department,  Congress  and  the  Department,  the Department  and  the
EPA,  the  Department  and United  States Attorneys'  offices,  and attor-
neys  within  the  Environmental  Crimes  Section  itself.  The  accusations
fall into two somewhat paradoxical  categories:  (1) claims that the Envi-
ronmental  Crimes  Section  has  overzealously  prosecuted  individuals
based  on technical,  relatively  harmless  violations  of the law; 8  and (2)
claims that the Section has  failed to prosecute  meritorious  cases.' 9
13.  Starr, supra note 5,  at 910.
14.  Michael  Isikoff, Reno Probes  Environmental  Crimes Unit, WASH.  POST, June  16,  1993,
at A12.
15.  See  Block, supra note 6, at 34.
16.  HARRIS  ET AL.,  supra note 2, at Int-3; see also Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel,
Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal  Liability  for Violations of Environmental  Statutes
in the 1990s,  16  COLUM.  J. ENVTL.  L.  201,  208  (1991)  (discussing  Department  of Justice's
high conviction  rate for  environmental  crimes).
17.  HARRIS  ET AL.,  supra note 2,  at Int-3.
18.  See, e.g.,  The Ellen Pardon, WALL ST.  J., Jan.  15,  1993,  at A10;  EPA's Most Wanted,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,  1992,  at A16; H. Jane Lehman, Trials and Tribulations  of Landowners,
L.A.  TIMES,  Oct.  18,  1992,  at  K2;  Property Busters, WALL  ST.  J.,  Jan.  11,  1990,  at  A14;
Wetlands Conviction Stirring  Heated Debate, WASH.  POST, Feb.  20,  1993,  at F6.
19.  See, e.g.,  William T. Hassler,  Congressional  Oversight of Federal  Environmental  Prose-
cutions:  The  Trashing of Environmental  Crimes, 24 Envtl.  L. Rptr. (Envtl.  L. Inst.)  10,074,
10,075-77  (Feb.  16,  1994); John H. Cushman,  Jr., Justice Department  Is Criticized Over Envi-
ronmental  Cases, N.Y. TIMEs,  Oct. 30,  1992,  at A16; Sharon LaFraniere, EPA Officials Criti-
cize Justice Dept.:  6 Tell House Panel  Polluters Unpunished, WASH.  POST,  Sept.  11,  1992,  at
A4; Keith  Schneider, $11  Million Pollution Fine Too Soft?,  N.Y.  TIME,  June  3, 1993,  at
D22;  Matthew  L. Wald, House Panel to Seek Subpoenas Over Settlement of H-Bomb  Case,
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Several  congressional  committees  and  subcommittees  have  re-
sponded by investigating the work of the Environmental Crimes Section.
A  few have  considered  claims  of overzealousness.2"  But most-led by
Representatives  Dingell, Schumer,  and Wolpe (who has since  left Con-
gress)-have been exploring the merits of accusations that Department
incompetence and malfeasance  have prompted the Department in some
instances  to allow  defendants  to plead  guilty to far less serious  offenses
than the evidence  would have  sustained and,  in  others, to decline alto-
gether to prosecute well-documented, serious violations of environmental
protection  laws.2
These committees  have held hearings that have focused  on many of
the  same  cases.  The  Department's  handling  of  its  prosecution  of
Rockwell  International regarding management of the Department of En-
ergy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapon facility is likely the most well-known.
In that  case the grand jury made public  its affirmative  desire  to  indict
Rockwell and individual  officers and employees for offenses  far more se-
rious  than  the  five  felony  and  five  misdemeanor  counts-against
Rockwell  alone-that  the Department  accepted  in a plea bargain  with
Rockwell.  The United States Attorney, at the behest of "Main  Justice"
officials in Washington, D.C., ultimately declined to sign the grand jury's
proffered indictment.22
Another matter receiving widespread attention involves the Depart-
ment's handling of its prosecution  of PureGro Company, an agricultural
chemical  application  and  distribution  company  located  in the state  of
Washington.  A  death  allegedly  resulted  from  PureGro's  disposing  of
N.Y. TIMES,  July 31,  1992, at AI5; Matthew L. Wald, Lawmakers Call Bomb Plant Prosecu-
tion Too Lenient, N.Y. TIMES,  Jan. 5, 1993,  at A9.
20.  See, e.g.,  Status of the Nation's Wetlands and Laws Related Thereto, Hearings  Before
the Subcomm. of Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
101st Cong.,  1st & 2d Sess.  930-58,  1024-41,  1094-164  (1991).
21.  See Environmental  Crimes Act of 1992, Hearing  Before the Subcomm. on Crimes and
Criminal Justice of the House Comm.  on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,  2d  Sess.  126-30  (1993)
[hereinafter Schumer Hearings];  EPA 's Criminal  Enforcement Program, Hearings  Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm.  on Energy and Commerce,
102d  Cong.,  2d  Sess. 2  (1992)  [hereinafter 1992 Dingell  Hearings];  Environmental Crimes at
the Rocky Flats  Nuclear Weapons Facility,  Documents Before the Subcomm.  on Investigations
and Oversight, of  the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology,  102d Cong.,  2d  Sess.
vols. I-I  (1992)  [hereinafter  Wolpe Hearings];  John D. Dingell, Opening Statement Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce (Nov. 3, 1993)  (on file with Loyola of  Los Angeles Law Review); Jonathon  Turley,  The
George  Washington  Univ. Nat'l  Law  Ctr., Preliminary  Report  on  Criminal  Environmental
Prosecution  by  the United  States Department of Justice, (Oct.  19,  1992)  [hereinafter  Turley
Report]  (on file  with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
22.  See Barry  Siegel, Showdown at Rocky Flats (pts.  1 & 2), L.A.  TIMES,  Aug.  8,  1993
(magazine),  at  12,  L.A. TIMES,  Aug.  15,  1993  (magazine),  at 22.
[Vol. 27:867ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIMES CONTROVERSY
hazardous  waste  on land in  violation of federal law.  The Department
permitted  PureGro to  plead guilty to a misdemeanor with a  small fine
although  reportedly  the defendant  initially  had  been  willing  to  plead
guilty to a felony count. 2 3
The Department, the EPA, and state government officials have testi-
fied at these congressional  hearings, as have members of the public who
are angry at what they perceive  to be the Department's  failure to  seek
heavy criminal sanctions for environmental violations in their communi-
ties.  The EPA and state government  officials have sometimes joined in
criticizing  Department  prosecutorial  decisions  before  Congress.2 4  Ac-
cordingly,  relations  between  the  Department's  Environmental  Crimes
Section  and EPA enforcement  personnel  are  strained  (at best).2'  And
relations between  that Section and  the United  States Attorneys'  offices
are no better, because Assistant United States Attorneys have been com-
plaining (apparently sometimes to Congress) that the Section's Chief and
his deputies have  declined to authorize their prosecution  of meritorious
cases.
26
Within  the Environmental  Crimes  Section  itself, there  is  likewise
great division  and personal  bitterness.  Some career lawyers  assert that
they will  no longer  work on controversial  environmental  cases.  Some
staff lawyers contend that Section leadership lacks the environmental law
expertise necessary to supervise  and judge the merits of proposed prose-
cutions.27  Those with supervisory  responsibility respond that many staff
lawyers lack the criminal  law litigation expertise required to render that
same judgment.  Internal strife has persisted rather than dissipated over
time, especially now that the Section is itself the subject of two focused
inquiries:  (1) an internal  investigation being  undertaken within the De-
partment  itself;  and  (2)  Representative  Dingell's  continuing  probe  in
which he is asking to interview career lawyers and, if refused, to use the
congressional  power of subpoena  to require their testimony.28
23.  See 1992 Dingell  Hearings,  supra note 21,  at 25; Turley  Report, supra note 21, at 39-
70.
24.  1992 Dingell Hearings,  supra note 21,  at 82-198.
25.  Linda Himelstein, DOJ's Environmental  Mess, LEGAL TIMES WASH., July 20,  1992, at
1, 22-23.
26.  Turley  Report, supra note  21, at  14-16,  25-27; Himelstein, supra note  25, at 22-23.
27.  Turley  Report, supra note 21,  at  17-21;  Himelstein, supra note 25,  at 23.
28.  Isikoff, supra note  14,  at A12; Marianne  Lavelle  & Marcia  Copley, Hill to Examine
Environmental  Prosecutions,  NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1993, at 5; see also Linda Himelstein, Justice
Probing  Its Environmental-Crimes  Chief,  LEGAL TiM-S WASH., June 28, 1993,  at 2 (discussing
allegations of ethical breaches of Section  Chief and other officials  and whether  congressional
investigations  would conflict with  policy of protecting prosecutors'  discretion).  The  Depart-
ment of Justice released the results of its internal inquiry just as this Essay was going to press.
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No congressional  committee has yet to issue a formal committee re-
port on the controversy, but the early returns are sharply  critical of the
Department.  As chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, former
Representative  Wolpe studied the prosecution  at Rocky Flats and, in a
report released in January  1993,  faulted Main  Justice's conservatism in
impeding the more aggressive efforts of prosecutors  in the field to secure
significant criminal sanctions.2 9  Wolpe also identified what he perceived
to be a double standard that allowed federal agency personnel to engage
in unlawful  activity without being subject to federal prosecution.3
Representative  Dingell has likewise contended that there are  "seri-
ous management  and  performance  problems  plaguing  the criminal  en-
forcement program. '31  In  an earlier letter to the Attorney  General,  he
asserted that his committee staff had "uncovered  deeply troubling allega-
tions suggesting that certain elements at the Environmental  Crimes Sec-
tion  at the Department  of Justice have  disrupted  and  undermined  the
EPA's criminal enforcement program."'32  More particularly,  Dingell has
advanced  several serious  charges,  including
the  declination  of prosecution  under  highly  questionable  cir-
cumstances  (including the strenuous  protests of the line attor-
neys  and  case  agents  involved),  the  apparently  preferential
treatment  of certain  large  and powerful  corporations,  the  re-
fusal to pursue the prosecution  of individuals  implicated in en-
vironmental  crimes  in  cases  where  such  individuals  were
See  WILLIAM  J.  CORCORAN  ET  AL.,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF JUSTICE,  INTERNAL  REVIEW  OF  THE
DEPARTMENT  OF JUSTICE  ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIMES  PROGRAM:  REPORT TO  THE  AsSOCI-
ATE ATTORNEY  GENERAL  (1994).  The conclusions of this report  are briefly  discussed infra
note 66.
29.  Howard Wape, House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, Report on the Pros-
ecution of Environmental  Crimes at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Facility, 20 (Jan.
4,  1993)  [hereinafter  Wolpe  Report]  (on  file with  Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).  In a
recent article, Bill Hassler, a former Environmental Crimes Section lawyer and member of the
Rocky Flats Prosecution Team, criticizes both the methods of investigation  and conclusions of
the congressional committees and their investigators.  See Hassler, supra note  19, at 10,077-87.
Hassler  emphasizes  the failure  of congressional  critics  to  interview  all  decision  makers  in-
volved prior to making their allegations,  the absence of evidence  to support their characteriza-
tions of the prosecutorial decisions they challenge, and ironically, their politicization of federal
criminal enforcement.  Id.
30.  Wolpe Report, supra note  29, at 20.
31.  Memorandum from John Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gations, to Members,  Subcommittee  on Oversight and Investigations 1 (Sept.  9, 1992) [herein-
after Dingell Memorandum]  (on  file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
32.  Letter from John  Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee  on Oversight and  Investigations,
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to William P. Barr, Attorney General  2 (July 6,
1992)  (on  file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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associated  with major  corporations  or  represented  by  certain
well-connected  attorneys,  the  convening  at  Main  Justice  of
closed-door meetings  with defense counsel without the knowl-
edge  of the EPA or the local  U.S. Attorney's  office,  and  the
ready agreement to trivial financial  penalties in cases involving
serious and long-standing environmental  violations.33
Finally, a preliminary report prepared  for Representative  Schumer
is equally  critical  of the Department's  performance.  The report found
evidence of the following:  (1) "a pronounced  failure to prosecute  envi-
ronmental crimes to the same degree as conventional crimes...  [and] to
prosecute  individuals";34  (2)  "deep  divisions  and  mistrust between  the
Environmental  Crimes Section and various United States Attorneys' of-
fices";35  (3)  "chronic  case mismanagement"; 3 6  and (4) "possible political
influence  in both individual  cases and general  policies  within the Envi-
ronmental  Crimes Section."
37
II.  THE ROOTS  OF  THE ENVIRONMENTAL  CRIMES  CONTROVERSY
A.  D&ad  Vu All Over Again?
For observers of environmental policy making over the past twenty-
five  years, much about the  environmental  crimes controversy  seems  all
too familiar.  To be sure, environmental  crime has  not previously  been
the subject of such great public attention and crisis atmosphere.  But this
current crisis nonetheless  seems to share much in common with a series
of such controversies  that have  plagued  environmental  law  during  the
past twenty years, ranging from the much publicized  Kepone incident in
the early  1970s  to Anne Gorsuch's tenure as EPA Administrator  in the
early  1980s.3'
33.  Id.
34.  Turley  Report, supra note 21,  at 5.
35.  Id.
36.  Id. at 6.
37.  Id.  The  General Accounting  Office  recently  released  its prepared  testimony  on the
environmental  crimes  enforcement program  for a hearing  chaired by Representative  Dingell
this  past November.  See  L. Nye Stevens,  Environmental  Crime:  Issues Related to  Justice's
Criminal  Prosecution  of Environmental  Offenses,  Testimony  before  the  Subcommittee  on
Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 3, 1993) (on
file  with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
38.  See generally Richard  J.  Lazarus,  The  Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental  Law,  LAW  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Autumn  1991,  at  311  (describing
"pathological cycle"  of public and institutional distrust of EPA that results in EPA failure and
breeds  further distrust); Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage  in the
Development of Federal  Environmental Criminal  Law, 35  WM.  & MARY L.  REV.  251  (1993)
April  1994]LOYOLA  OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
As public aspirations for environmental protection, which have been
uncompromising, have collided with the public's unwillingness to pay the
costs associated with that change, the various parts of the federal govern-
ment associated with implementing environmental protection policy have
frequently become  objects of public criticism and even  scorn.  These in-
clude  criticisms  both  from those- who  believe  that the government  has
failed to achieve promised pollution reductions as well as from those who
believe  that  the  government  is  imposing  unnecessarily  high  clean-up
costs on society.  Moreover, because environmental  restrictions often are
based  on uncertain  scientific  information,  require  significant  economic
dislocations, and relate to highly charged public health  matters, there is
typically much fodder for critics from either perspective.39
The  fragmented  nature  of environmental  policy  making  provides
further  fuel for controversy.  The  executive  and legislative branches  of
the federal government  have maintained  different perspectives  on many
of these issues, as have the EPA and the Department, the headquarters of
these agencies  in Washington,  D.C., and their branch  offices  across the
country.  As  a  result,  the  initial  source  for  much  of  the  criticism
launched at one part of the government  is, more often than not, another
part of the government.
No doubt the greatest source of friction between governmental insti-
tutions has persisted between  Congress  and the executive  branch.  The
tension between  the executive and legislative branches in environmental
law making is longstanding.  The early Nixon years established a culture
of  congressional  suspicion  regarding  the  willingness  of  the  executive
branch to undertake a good faith effort to implement the ambitious envi-
ronmental protection laws Congress was enacting.  That culture remains
fairly  dominant  in  Congress  today,  almost  twenty-five  years  later, and
largely explains  how  quickly  certain  congressional  subcommittees  hold
oversight hearings  to second guess executive branch motives in the for-
mulation of environmental policy.'
There is, in fact, reason for congressional  concern.  A philosophical
split has persisted between  the two branches  of government  on environ-
mental issues during the past twenty-five years.  While Congress has en-
acted  laws  largely  reflective  of  the  nation's  aspirations  regarding
(describing environmental crimes controversy as expression  of ongoing, albeit submerged,  de-
bate between two competing approaches  to environmental  policymaking).
39.  Id.  at 321-22, 347-48.
40.  See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional  Oversight  of
EPA: Quis Custodiet  Ipsos Custodes (Who  Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, LAW &
CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Autumn 1991,  at 205, 214-19 (criticizing "EPA bashing"  and certain con-
gressional  representatives'  swift public denunciation  of EPA mistakes).
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environmental protection, the executive branch has been more responsive
to those concerned about the economic and social costs of implementing
those laws.41
The upshot has been  a steady supply  of interbranch  feuding.  The
EPA, often prompted-or compelled-by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), has frequently construed congressional  enactments  to al-
low for greater consideration of economic cost than the plain meaning of
the statutory  language  would  seem to  suggest  is permissible.  Congres-
sional critics denounce the executive branch in the press, hold oversight
hearings  to  attract  further public  attention,  and  otherwise  seek  to use
their considerable leverage-through  confirmation authority or the budg-
etary process-to persuade the executive branch to reverse its position.42
The two branches  view these disputes quite differently.  The execu-
tive branch  sees them  largely as  simple  "policy  disputes"  and congres-
sional  criticism  as  simply  "politics  as  usual."  Many  in  Congress,
however,  adopt  a  far  dimmer  view.  They  contend  that the  executive
branch,  by not  fully utilizing  the reach of the law  as  enacted,  is itself
acting unlawfully.
Rarely,  however, have these persistent,  simmering interbranch  dis-
putes  developed  into full-fledged  conflagrations.  One  reason  why  that
likely occurred in the case of environmental  crime is  also why it likely
occurred  during  the  tenure  of Anne  Gorsuch  as  EPA Administrator.
The  executive branch must possess a certain  modicum of credibility  to
withstand the pressures  in the environmental  policy  arena, particularly
those pressures generated by the press reporting on congressional  claims
of executive  branch  malfeasance  or  on  disputes  within  the  executive
branch  itself.  Any  significant  corroboration  of the merits  of congres-
sional or  regional  agency  office  suspicion  of an  executive  branch  "sell
out" to-or "sweetheart  deal"  with-industry  invariably  unleashes  an
avalanche of media attention and public outcry.43
Administrator Gorsuch triggered just such an avalanche  with a se-
ries of missteps, beginning  with her close relationship  with Interior Sec-
retary  James  Watt, that  suggested  the  realization  of Congress's  worst
fears regarding industry capture of the EPA.44  Largely because the EPA
since has had a series of exceptionally respected and credible Administra-
41.  See id. at 222-26.
42.  Id.  at 210-18.
43.  Apparently  in anticipation of this public perception problem, and perhaps in response
to the  problems currently  facing  the Department,  EPA Administrator  Carol Browner is re-
portedly drafting  a memorandum advising  all agency  political  appointees to avoid  becoming
involved  in individual  enforcement  cases.
44.  Lazarus, supra note 38,  at 345-47.
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tors-William Ruckelshaus,  Lee Thomas, William Reilly-no controver-
sies  of  a  similarly  overwhelming  magnitude  have  plagued  the  EPA.
Those Administrators possessed the credibility needed to respond to con-
gressional criticism and to explain themselves and their differing perspec-
tives  even in the face of heated controversy.
The  environmental  crimes controversy  occurred when  (during the
second half of the Bush Administration)  and where  (within the Depart-
ment) it did partly because the Environment Division lacked that essen-
tial modicum of credibility.45  It is not yet clear the extent to which the
Environment  Division's  political  leadership  actually  intended  to  signal
career lawyers to scrutinize more closely recommendations  to criminally
prosecute  the  violation  of  federal  environmental  protection  laws,  or
whether those political appointees, as some claim, 46  actively discouraged
criminal  investigations  of environmental  violations.  Within  a  bureau-
cracy, however, not much  is required to send  a message of emphasis  or
deemphasis to career staff.  And,  when resources  are stretched  thin, an
implicit signal of a mere shift in priorities may have a significant practical
impact.
What is increasingly  clear, however,  is that regardless of the extent
to  which  the  environmental  crimes  controversy  resulted  from  smoke
rather  than  fire,47  the  Environment  Division's  corresponding  lack  of
credibility  proved  dispositive.  The  Environment  Division  could  not
credibly  refute  accusations  that  close  prosecutorial  decisions  resulted
from undue political influence  rather than from neutral  decisions  of ca-
reer lawyers.  Without the benefit of the doubt, virtually all of the Envi-
ronment Division's exercise of prosecutorial discretion became tainted by
claims of possible political motivation.
Unless  Department  officials  can credibly  explain  the  reasons  for  a
decision not to prosecute in a particular case, the public and Congress are
likely to suspect the worst.  Because such credibility was lacking, suspi-
cion  instead  begot  further  suspicion,  until  the  entire  environmental
crimes program was ultimately  overwhelmed by  intense public scrutiny
and criticism.  The Bush Administration proved that it had forgotten the
lesson of the Gorsuch era under Reagan, which is that Congress and the
public will not tolerate executive branch efforts-or even the appearance
of efforts-to undermine  environmental  protection  programs.
45.  The principal period  at issue was between  the spring of 1991  and the spring of 1992,
when the Acting Assistant  Attorney General was Barry  Hartman.
46.  See Dingell Memorandum, supra note 31,  at 1-2; Turley Report, supra note 21,  at 6-
25;  Wolpe Report, supra note 29,  at  12-16.
47.  See Hassler, supra note 19,  at  10,077-87.
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What made the environmental crimes controversy perhaps even less
tenable and therefore more volatile, however, was its location in the De-
partment.  A prosecutor's decision not to prosecute is generally assumed
to be far removed,  if not totally  insulated,  from the whims of electoral
politics.  History  may  suggest this claim to be more fictional than real.
But, even if so, it is a fiction that can prove costly to those who challenge
it too overtly.  The  environmental  crimes  program  is  now paying  that
high price.
B.  The Problem with Environmental Crime
The  lessons  to be learned  from  the environmental  crimes  contro-
versy,  however,  run  far  deeper  than  policy  conflicts  between  the
executive branch and Congress.  Nor are they confined to the pitfalls as-
sociated with a  few political  appointees  unwittingly  fueling  decades  of
congressional distrust of the executive branch's willingness to enforce en-
vironmental requirements.  They extend instead to how Congress has de-
fined environmental  crimes in the  environmental pollution  control  laws
and the institutional  collisions  fostered by that legislative approach.
The argument  in favor of criminal  sanctions in environmental  pro-
tection laws is fairly straightforward and compelling-indeed deceptively
so.  First, the harms that environmental laws seek to prevent can be just
as  significant,  and  sometimes  even  more  so,  than those  implicated  by
more traditional  criminal acts.  For instance, pollution of a public drink-
ing water supply  can  imperil the health,  even with fatal  results,  of an
entire community.  Just because the wrongdoer has done so by way of an
environmental medium-such  as air or water-does  not make that con-
duct any less deserving of criminal sanction.48  Environmental law, there-
fore, is not simply another kind of economic regulation.  It is more often
akin  to public health  and safety law in its basic thrust.
Second,  the  moral  culpability  of those  who  violate  environmental
laws can be as  great as those  who commit  any  of the more traditional
common-law-based  crimes, such as murder, robbery, or assault.  Individ-
uals who violate environmental laws may do so for reasons no more justi-
fiable and no less reprehensible than those motivating the most  venal of
criminals.  Certainly, the fact that many violators  of environmental  laws
do so to maximize profits does not make their conduct less culpable, nor
48.  See KATHLEEN  F. BRICKEY,  CORPORATE AND  WHITE COLLAR  CRIME:  CASES  AND
MATERIALS  477  n.1  (1990)  (citing Department of Justice study  finding that  "public  ranked
knowingly  polluting a city's water supply as more serious than heroin smuggling, if the pollu-
tion caused  twenty  people to become  ill but not sick enough  to require medical treatment").
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does  it distinguish  environmental  crimes  from  many  other  crimes  that
have long been subject to harsh criminal  sanctions.
Finally,  absent  the  possibility  of  criminal  sanctions,  particularly
those  directed  at  individuals  (including  corporate  officers),  companies
may view  sanctions for violating environmental  laws  as a  mere  cost of
doing business.  Companies  can gamble  that the government  enforcers
will  not  discover their violations  and,  even  if that  gamble  fails,  offset
those costs by the excess profits they gained through past noncompliance.
Depending  on market  conditions,  companies  that  are  sanctioned  may
also be able to pass through to consumers the costs of any civil penalties
by charging more for their goods and services.  And, when such charges
cannot  be passed  through,  the company  may  even  choose  to  declare
bankruptcy to gain  a fresh  start.
Criminal  sanctions,  however, do not suffer from these same limita-
tions.  The mere threat of their imposition makes  corporate officers take
notice.  Prison sentences can apply to officers and employees in their per-
sonal capacities.  They are not simply a cost of doing business-their im-
pact can be  devastating.  The  moral  stigma associated  with a  criminal
conviction can, standing alone, irreparably destroy not only existing and
future economic relations, but social and familial  relations as well.49
The economic  effect of criminal  sanctions imposed  on a  corporate
entity rather than on an individual can likewise be more devastating than
civil penalties.  Business can suffer from the stigma of a conviction  and
there  may  also be collateral  consequences  that flow from  a conviction.
For instance, a conviction under many existing environmental  laws sub-
jects the defendant company to "debarment,"  meaning that the company
is not eligible to enter into a contract with the federal  government for a
specified  time  period. 0  For large  companies,  the impact  of such  a  re-
striction  is  substantial,  and  for smaller  companies,  the  impact  can  be
catastrophic.
49.  See generally Susan Hedman,  Expressive Functions of Criminal  Sanctions in Environ-
mental Law,  59  GEO.  WASH.  L. REV.  889  (1991);  see also Webster  L. Hubbell,  Testimony
Before the Subcommittee  on Oversight and  Investigations,  House Committee on  Energy and
Commerce  2 (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with Loyola of  Los Angeles Law Review)  ("Nothing works
better at getting managers to pay attention  to environmental  compliance than the prospect  of
going to prison  and the prospect of fines and other penalties for their companies.").
50.  See, e.g.,  Clean Water Act of 1977,  33 U.S.C.A.  § 1368(a) (West  1986); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C.  § 7606  (1988  & Supp. III  1991).  See generally David T. Buente  et al.,  The "Civil"
Implications of Environmental Crime, 23  Envtl. L. Rep.  (Envtl. L. Inst.)  10,589,  10,598-600
(Oct.  1993)  (analyzing  relationship between  civil  and criminal enforcement  of environmental
laws).
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Congress responded positively to these arguments in favor of crimi-
nal sanctions by including criminal sanctions in almost all of the federal
environmental  protection  laws.  The response was,  however, also indis-
criminate:  Congress made virtually all "knowing"  and some "negligent"
violations of environmental pollution control standards, limitations, per-
mits, and licenses  subject to criminal  as well as to civil sanctions.  Con-
gress  made  relatively  little  effort  to  define  thresholds  for  when  a
defendant's conduct justified adding the possibility of criminal sanctions
to  civil  penalties.  Except for the knowing  and  negligent  mens  rea  re-
quirements, Congress just assumed that the civil and criminal thresholds
should be precisely the same.  The problems with such an assumption are
several.
First, the environmental standards are not set based on the existence
of traditional notions of criminal culpability.  Violations of environmen-
tal laws may, of course, involve the most serious risks to human health
and of catastrophic,  irreversible  environmental  damage.  But the  stan-
dards upon which those statutory violations are in fact based do not de-
pend on the existence of such risks or damage.  They are instead set at far
more  precautionary,  risk-averse  levels  of  protection  against  risks  to
human  health  and  the  environment.  The  public-this  Author  in-
eluded-may believe that such precautionary levels are wise and appro-
priate, but that presents a far different public policy issue than whether
all such violations rise to a level justifying severe criminal as well as civil
sanctions.  By  simply  equating  the  regulatory  thresholds  for  civil  and
criminal  sanctions,  however,  Congress  never  directly  addressed  this
issue.
Congress,  for the most part, has not been especially  discriminating
in defining the mens rea requirements for environmental crimes.  Instead,
consistent with the rationale that criminal  sanctions serve regulatory de-
terrent purposes, Congress  sought to maximize  their deterrent  effect by
deemphasizing  mens  rea  elements  for the imposition  of criminal  sanc-
tions.  Hence,  although  the  environmental  statutes  generally  require
some mens rea for criminal prosecution-they are not simply strict liabil-
ity offenses s '-they do not require much at all in terms of the defendant's
knowledge  of  the  actual  risks  of  his  or  her  activity.  As  a  result,
51.  Section  16 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899,  however, does  define a strict liability
environmental  criminal offense.  See  33 U.S.C.  § 411  (1988).  For a  thoughtful discussion  of
some of the problems posed by Congress's recent emphasis on strict liability crimes, and possi-
ble solutions, see Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith  Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes,
78 CORNELL  L. REV.  401 (1993).
52.  See, e.g.,  M. Diane Barber, Fair Warning:  The Deterioration  of Scienter Under Envi-
ronmental  Criminal  Statutes, 26 Loy.  L.A. L. REv.  105,  144-47  (1992);  Kevin A. Gaynor et
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although persons  who violate environmental  laws may possess  the most
venal  and reprehensible  of states  of mind-and thus warrant  the  most
severe  criminal sanction-the  environmental  criminal  sanctions  do  not
require such a state of mind. 3
What makes such an approach to mens rea particularly problematic
in the environmental law context is that environmental standards, unlike
most traditional  crimes, present questions  of degree rather than of kind.
Murder,  burglary,  assault,  and  embezzlement  are  simply  unlawful.
There is no threshold level below which  such conduct  is acceptable.  In
contrast, pollution is not unlawful per se:  In many circumstances, some
pollution  is  acceptable.  It  is  only  pollution  that  exceeds  certain  pre-
scribed levels  that is unlawful.  But, for that  very  reason, the  mens  rea
element should arguably be a more, not less, critical element in the prose-
cution of an environmental  offense.
Finally, Congress  failed to adequately  account for the fact that the
civil standards  are often set at an action-forcing  level and are  anything
but static.  The standards do not necessarily  reflect standards  of perform-
ance that are  either  economically  or  technologically  feasible.  They  do
not reflect existing conduct or long-settled  cultural norms.  They instead
are more likely to reflect policy makers' predictions of what will be possi-
ble and the public's  aspirations for a cleaner  environment.  The  under-
lying  science  is  often  very  uncertain,  and  the  regulations  constantly
change in response to  new information,  court  challenges, and sweeping
statutory amendments.
Full  compliance  with  all  applicable  environmental  laws  is  conse-
quently  the exception  rather  than  the  norm.  Just as  the  EPA  rarely
meets congressional  aspirations in meeting all of the deadlines in environ-
al., Environmental  Criminal  Prosecutions: Simple Fixes  for a Flawed System,  3  VILL. ENVTL.
L.J.  1, 11-21  (1992);  R. Christopher Locke, Environmental  Crimes: The Absence of  Intent and
the Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL.  L. 311  (1991);  Ruth Ann Weidel et al.,
The Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental  Criminal  Prosecutions, 21  SETON  HALL L.  REV.
1100  (1991);  Lisa  Ann Harig, Note, Ignorance Is Not Bliss:  Responsible Corporate Officers
Convicted of Environmental  Crimes and the Federal  Sentencing Guidelines, 42  DUKE L.J.  145
(1992);  Michael  Vitiello,  Note, Does Culpability Matter?: Statutory Construction Under 42
U.S.C. §  6928, 6 TUL.  ENVTL. L.J.  187,  214-29 (1993).
53.  To  be sure, many of the environmental  statutes include  a  "knowing  endangerment"
offense, which imposes  even greater criminal sanctions on those violators who act with knowl-
edge  of the  significant  risks  they  impose, see, e.g.,  Clean  Water  Act of  1977,  33  U.S.C.A.
§ 1319(c)(3)  (West  1986 & Supp. 1993); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C.A.  § 6928(e)  (West  1983); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)  (1988  & Supp. III  1992),
but the problems that have developed  in the prosecution of environmental  crimes have gener-
ally not resulted from these more  demanding provisions.  They instead  result from the vague
delegations of prosecutorial  discretion  that inhere in those  criminal provisions  that lack such
requirements.  See infra notes  58-60 and accompanying  text.
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mental  laws-it  meets  roughly  fourteen  percent  of  all  congressional
deadlines54-- industry rarely meets all of those aspirations  as reflected in
the statutory and regulatory requirements themselves.  Nor does govern-
ment itself or its contractors-as in Rocky  Flats-strictly comply  with
environmental requirements.  In a recent survey, two-thirds of all corpo-
rate counsel reported that their companies have recently been in violation
of applicable environmental  laws."
For that reason, however, there is  a danger, indeed a potential  im-
propriety,  in  Congress's  approach  to  environmental  criminal  liability.
The question whether certain conduct warrants a criminal sanction is far
different than whether a civil  sanction may be warranted,  precisely be-
cause the latter is susceptible to being no more than an economic disin-
centive.  Criminal  liability  standards  should  be  more  settled  and  less
dynamic.  They should be more reflective  of what in fact can be accom-
plished  rather than  of the  public's  aspirations  of how,  if pushed,  the
world can change in the future.
Perhaps  most importantly,  criminal  sanctions  should  also  be tem-
pered by  the gravity of the decision  that certain  conduct  warrants  the
most severe of sanctions.  Criminal  sanctions are not simply another en-
forcement tool in the regulator's  arsenal to promote public policy objec-
tives.56  A criminal sanction is fundamentally  different in character.  The
reason  why  criminal  sanctions  have  greater  deterrent  value  is  also the
reason  why  they- must  be  used  more  selectively.  Criminal  sanctions
should be reserved for the more culpable subset of offenses and not used
solely for their ability to deter.
To date, Congress,  however, has made no meaningful or systematic
effort to consider criminal  sanctions as presenting an issue distinct from
that presented by civil sanctions.  Congress has not tried to identify those
54.  Lazarus, supra note  38, at 324.
55.  Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise:  Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., Aug.  30,  1993,
at S1.
56. See  generally FRANCIS  A.  ALLEN,  INT'L  INST.  FOR  ECONOMIC  RESEARCH,  THE
CRIMINAL  LAW  AS  AN  INSTRUMENT  OF ECONOMIC  REGULATION  (1976)  (discussing  social
costs of using criminal law as instrument of economic regulation);  Harry V. Ball & Lawrence
M. Friedman,  The Use of Criminal  Sanctions in the Enforcement of  Economic Legislation: A
Sociological View,  17 STAN.  L.  REV.  197  (1964-65)  (exploring  relationship between  popular
morality and use of criminal sanctions  in regulating business practices);  Henry M.  Hart, Jr.,
The Aims of the Criminal  Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBS.  401  (1958)  (discussing institu-
tional considerations  involved at various levels of decision making in criminal law); Sanford H.
Kadish, Some  Observations  on the Use of Criminal  Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regula-
tions, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423  (1963)  (outlining special characteristics  of economic regulatory
legislation relevant  to use of criminal sanctions); Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM.  L.  REV. 55  (1933)  (discussing department of public welfare offenses  that are punish-
able without  any criminal  intent).
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circumstances  in which  the culpability  of conduct  warrants  taking the
next step of imposing criminal sanctions.  Congress has not tried to iden-
tify those kinds of environmental standards for which criminal sanctions
are more appropriate.  Nor has Congress focused as carefully as it should
on the mens rea issue.
Congress's failure to consider any of these issues provides the source
of much of the institutional conflict underlying the environmental crimes
controversy.  By criminalizing far more conduct than it would expect to
be the subject of criminal enforcement,  Congress has, in effect,  delegated
all of the line-drawing issues to the executive branch without providing
any  guidance  on how  that  discretion  should  be  exercised.  No  doubt
there are public  policy  areas in which  such open-ended  delegations  are
workable, probably because  the legislative branch  is willing to  trust the
executive branch's  implementation and because there is otherwise  some
shared understanding between  and within those branches  regarding how
that discretion  should be exercised.  When, however,  neither such trust
nor such a shared understanding  exists, an open-ended  delegation can be
a recipe for disaster, especially  when public health concerns are likely to
trigger substantial  public scrutiny and second guessing.
The current  environmental  crimes  debacle  demonstrates just  that
potential.  The clear lesson of the past twenty-five years of environmental
law and policy  making is that trust and shared  understanding  is sorely
lacking.  Many in Congress, particularly those on the authorization com-
mittees that drafted the statutes, harbor  deep suspicions of the  willing-
ness  of the  executive  branch  to  fully  implement  those  laws  precisely
because of the absence of shared understanding.  Parts of the executive
branch,  particularly  within  the  Office of Management  and  Budget  and
the White House,57 have frequently confirmed the validity of those suspi-
cions by expressing skepticism of the utility of literal application of envi-
ronmental laws.
The executive branch, moreover, has further exacerbated  the prob-
lem in the environmental criminal context.  Rather than fill the vacuum
left by  Congress, the executive branch has failed to develop specific  gui-
dance  governing the  exercise  of prosecutorial  discretion in the  environ-
mental  crimes  area.58  Nor  has  the  executive  branch  otherwise  made
57.  See generally Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight
of the Environmental  Protection Agency,  LAW  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Autumn  1991,  at  127
(exploring tension between  rule of law and politics of regulation reflected in executive branch's
oversight of EPA).
58.  The only forum in which some of these issues are currently being  debated is before  the
United States  Sentencing Commission, which  has for several years been developing organiza-
tional sentencing guidelines for environmental  crimes.  The sentencing debate, of course, does
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much effort to explain publicly its decision-making  process  in any  sys-
tematic way.
Compounding matters, decision-making authority is fragmented be-
tween the EPA and  the Department,  and between  regional and  head-
quarters  offices  within  both  of  those  agencies.  Those  who  initiate
investigations do not, for that reason, necessarily apply the same criteria
in evaluating  a case that will ultimately be applied by those  who make
the final decision whether to prosecute.  Such discrepancies invite misun-
derstandings and controversy, particularly  when, as has occurred in the
case of environmental crimes, those final prosecution decisions are made
in a high-handed  fashion, without giving those most intimately involved
either the opportunity to participate or a written explanation  of the final
decision.
The dispute within the Environmental  Crimes Section itself is a mi-
crocosm of the entire problem.  Lawyers  whose expertise is  in environ-
mental law bring a different perspective to their evaluation of a case than
not concern the nature of criminal conduct, but the related, antecedent  issue of how to deter-
mine the appropriate  level  of punishment for different kinds of environmental  criminal viola-
tions.  The Sentencing Commission did not originally include  environmental crimes in its  1991
organizational sentencing guidelines because of the contentiousness of the issues involved.  See
Garry Sturgess, Environmental  Crime Guidelines Postponed, LEGAL TIMES  WASH.,  Apr. 15,
1991,  at 7.  The Sentencing  Commission sought  to break through  the impasse that  had im-
peded  its  work in  this  area by appointing  an Advisory  Working  Group  on  Environmental
Sanctions, comprised of individuals bringing different expertise and perspectives (government,
industry,  academic)  to the issue.  See Linda Himelstein,  Sentencing Guidelines: A Punishing
Process, LEGAL TIMES  WASH.,  Dec.  21,  1992,  at 1.  The Advisory  Working Group issued its
working draft  recommendations  on  March  5,  1993.  See Memorandum  from the  Advisory
Working  Group  on Environmental  Sanctions  to  Interested  Members of the  Public (Mar.  5,
1993)  (on  file  with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).  However,  those recommendations
prompted an avalanche of criticism  from industry as well as from government.  See, e.g.,  U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Comments  on Working Draft of Recommended  Sentencing Guidelines  for
Organizations  Convicted  of Federal  Environmental  Crimes  (May  10,  1993)  (on  file  with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Comments of Former Justice Department and EPA Offi-
cials on Draft Environmental Guidelines  Prepared by Advisory  Working Group on Environ-
mental Sanctions (Apr. 16,  1993) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); see also Cris
Carmody, Proposed Guidelines  for Environmental Crimes Irk Business, NAT'L L.J.,  May  3,
1993,  at  19  (criticizing  sentencing  guidelines  for  organizations  convicted  of environmental
crimes).  On November  16,  1993, the Advisory Working Group issued its revised draft recom-
mendations, which substantially amended its earlier draft in response to those comments.  The
reasons for these delays and contentiousness are not unrelated to the problems currently facing
the entire  environmental  crimes program.  The  gulf separating  those debating the  merits of
criminal sanctions for environmental crimes is so great, and the consensus so thin, that agree-
ment has  been  exceedingly  difficult  to reach.  Moreover,  because  Congress  criminalized  so
much potential  conduct,  the sentencing  guidelines  issues have  become  quite important  and
very heated.  The  issues that should have  been  considered  at  the front  end  of the  criminal
process-that is,  whether  specific  conduct should be subject  to criminal sanction  in the first
instance-have instead  been relegated  to the sentencing phase.LOYOLA  OF LOS ANGELES  LAW REVIEW
those whose expertise lies instead only in more traditional areas of crimi-
nal law.  Environmental  law experts  tend to be more swayed-perhaps
too much so-by the deterrent value of prosecution  and therefore more
willing to promote the broader liability theories.  In contrast, the crimi-
nal experts  tend to be more demanding-also  perhaps  too much so-in
their search for the kind of showing of criminal culpability that they are
used to having to establish in more traditional  areas of criminal  law.
Unfortunately, that clash of perspectives has been intensified, rather
than mitigated, in the Environmental Crimes  Section because there  are
few  within the Section possessing the dual  expertise required  to bridge
the gap.  There are instead two distinct camps.  Those in leadership posi-
tions  possess  principal  expertise  in  criminal,  not  environmental,  law,
while the career staff tend to have the opposite emphasis.  The upshot has
been constant clashes of view regarding how to proceed between the two
camps  within the Section, with those  "criminal  lawyers"  in leadership
positions being more skeptical  of some of the more  aggressive  enforce-
ment theories propounded  by the career "environmental  lawyers."
Moreover, when Section leadership has decided not to authorize rec-
ommended prosecutions, it has lacked the credibility to have its decisions
readily  accepted  within the  government  itself, let  alone  by  interested
members  of the general  public.  Career  lawyers  within the  Section  and
EPA officials in both the headquarters  and the regions fault those deci-
sions for not reflecting an accurate understanding of environmental  law.
The United States Attorneys'  offices  do not react any more favora-
bly when  Main Justice  closely  scrutinizes and sometimes  refuses to ap-
prove their requests to initiate an environmental crimes prosecution.  The
United States Attorneys and their assistants naturally resist being second
guessed by Main Justice on criminal matters. 9  In most areas those gov-
ernment prosecutors  are fairly  autonomous  when  it comes  to  deciding
whether to initiate a prosecution; prior approval from Main Justice is not
required.  Environmental  crimes is  one of the exceptions  to that rule.'
59.  See, e.g.,  Breckinridge  L. Willcox,  Testimony Before the Subcommittee  on  Oversight
and Investigations,  House  Committee on Energy  and Commerce (Nov. 3, 1993)  (on file  with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Robert J. Wortham, Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations,  House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 3, 1993)
(on  file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
60.  In his recent  testimony before the House, Associate Attorney General Hubbell sought
to dispel  the notion  that the degree  of control exercised  by  Main  Justice over environmental
criminal  matters  was out of step with the Department's  traditional approach  to other  areas.
See Hubbell, supra note 49, at  10-14.  Hubbell testified that "the  U.S. Attorneys Offices  have
significantly  broader responsibilities  for environmental  crimes than they have  in other highly
complex regulatory  areas such as  tax and antitrust,"  id.,  and that in the civil and civil rights
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The reason for that exception also supplies the reason why so much
antagonism  has recently  resulted between  Main Justice  and the United
States Attorneys'  offices.  The rationale for the preapproval requirement
is that environmental law is such a new and complex area of law that it is
necessary  to have those who possess environmental law expertise review
prosecution  recommendations  to ensure quality control and to avoid ad-
verse  precedent.  When, however,  such centralized review  is  conducted
by those in leadership  positions  who do  not possess such expertise, the
United  States  Attorneys  are  less  accepting  of adverse  determinations.
When, moreover, the specter of improper political influence is added to
the equation-as  occurred during the last few years of the Bush Admin-
istration-what might have been simply "less  accepting"  can be quickly
transformed  into accusations  of incompetence  or even  malfeasance.
III.  ASSIMILATING  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION
INTO  CRIMINAL  LAW
Environmental  law has assimilated so poorly into criminal  law be-
cause  environmental  policy  makers  have  done  a  commensurately  poor
job of considering the distinct values,  purposes, and limitations of crimi-
nal law.  Assimilation requires give and take, as the values, purposes, and
limitations of each legal context responds to the other.  Bankruptcy  and
environmental  law, for instance,  have been undergoing just such a pro-
cess of assimilation during the past decade;61 the evolution of the laws of
standing,62 property, 6 3  equitable  remedies,64 and securities law,65  among
others, could be similarly characterized.
By contrast,  criminal  law has  simply been seen  as  another way  to
achieve  environmental  policy objectives  by maximizing the law's poten-
tial for deterrence.  The executive and legislative branches have not been
divisions "the  approval of the relevant Assistant Attorney General  is necessary in a variety of
designated areas before a U.S.  Attorney can  take significant  action  in a criminal  matter," id.
61.  See generally Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental  Obligations  in Bankruptcy: A Funda-
mental Framework, 44 U. FLA.  L. REy.  153  (1992)  (addressing problems with environmental
obligations in bankruptcy that confront courts).
62.  See  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of Wildlife,  112  S.  Ct.  2130,  2146-47  (1992)  (Kennedy,  J.,
concurring).  See generally Cass  R. Sunstein,  What's Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits,
Injuries, and  Article III, 91  MIcH.  L. REV.  163 (1992)  (discussing justifiability of invalidating
congressional grant of standing without investigating  relevant history).
63.  See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,  112  S. Ct. 2886, 2903  (1992)  (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
64. See  Amoco  Prod. Co. v.  Village of Gambell,  480 U.S.  531  (1987);  Daniel A. Farber,
Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental  Injunctions, 45 U.  PrrT.  L. REV.  513
(1984).
65.  See, e.g.,  United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. International  Paper Co., 985  F.2d 1190
(2d  Cir.  1993).
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carefully  considering  the character  of particular  environmental  regula-
tions  (for example,  health  and  safety  versus economic)  or  the distinct
values, purposes, and limitations of criminal law in defining federal envi-
ronmental crimes.  Both branches need to revisit those issues now.
Congress  needs  to replace  the  existing indiscriminate  broad-brush
approach by defining environmental  crimes in ways that better  establish
criminal culpability and better identify the kind of conduct that Congress
in fact expects to be prosecuted criminally.  This should allow for a more
effective and fair criminal enforcement program that is better focused on
those instances deserving of severe  criminal  sanction.  The result should
not be less environmental criminal prosecution, but more, because of the
advantages  of focusing  prosecutorial  resources  on  the biggest  problem
areas.
The  executive  branch likewise  needs  to reform its  approach,  espe-
cially given the existing vacuum of settled prosecution criteria.  Working
together, the Department and the EPA need to establish guidelines and
formal  interagency  memoranda  of understanding  that  reflect  a  shared
understanding  of  when  circumstances  justify  supplementing  civil  en-
forcement with criminal sanctions.  Under the current system, those who
make that initial  determination  do  not  apply  the  same  criteria  that  is
applied by  those who  make the ultimate decision whether  to prosecute
several years later.  As a result, years of limited investigatory  resources
are wasted, and ultimately the goodwill of government employees is lost.
To that same end,  there needs  to be better coordination  generally
between  civil  and  criminal  enforcement  efforts,  consistent,  of course,
with  grand jury secrecy  limitations that apply to  criminal  proceedings.
There are  currently  two parallel tracks and virtually  no interaction.  A
decision, for instance, not to pursue a criminal  prosecution  does not au-
tomatically trigger an immediate inquiry whether to bring a civil enforce-
ment action instead.  The case just ends.
There  is likewise  little effort to  involve the public  in the  decision-
making process.  Criminal prosecutors are traditionally reluctant to com-
municate with the public regarding  prosecutorial  decisions.  And  there
are  generally  good  reasons  for that reluctance to  engage  in a  dialogue
that risks trying a case in the media rather than in a court of law.  When,
however,  as frequently  occurs  with allegations  of environmental  crime,
the public harbors significant fears  about related health and safety mat-
ters, the government has an added responsibility  to address  those public
concerns.  The  government  cannot  simply  decline  comment  on  those
matters.  The government must, to be sure, avoid prejudicing any pend-
ing enforcement actions.  But it should be able to do so without remain-
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ing completely silent about existing hazards.  In addition, when the case
is over, particularly when the government has decided to decline prose-
cution,  the government must make extra  efforts  to explain its decision
making to the public, while adhering to grand jury secrecy limitations.
Finally, the Department needs to reform the Environmental Crimes
Section itself. One reason why the Section is functioning so poorly is that
it stopped  serving its original purpose.  The justification  for such a sec-
tion within the Environment Division was based on the need to have a
primary environmental  focus.  Environmental  laws are complex and re-
quire expertise that the United States Attorneys do not always possess or
have the time to obtain.  Criminal enforcement must also be closely coor-
dinated  with civil  enforcement,  particularly  to  the extent  that judicial
precedent  interpreting  statutory language  in one context  necessarily  af-
fects  enforcement  actions in the other.
These justifications remain sound, yet the Section no longer serves
those ends.  Most simply put, it makes no  sense to have  Section leader-
ship versed primarily in criminal and not  environmental  law.  The Sec-
tion  might as  well be in  the  Criminal  Division because,  as has  in fact
happened, the reasons for an Environmental Crimes Section are not real-
ized.  Rather than a section of environmental criminal experts, it has suf-
fered a split between Section  leadership and its career staff.  In addition,
the coordination  between  the leadership  of Environmental  Crimes  Sec-
tion and those in the Environmental Enforcement Section responsible for
civil enforcement has been virtually  nonexistent.  Their perspectives and
priorities are too different.  Those in United States Attorneys'  offices like-
wise have had little reason to defer to Section leadership and more reason
to rebel at having to obtain approval from them prior to bringing a case.
It is absolutely  essential, therefore, that the Section be headed by those
with significant environmental law and criminal  law backgrounds.  It is
likewise essential that those heading the civil and criminal  enforcement
efforts in the Environment Division coordinate their approaches to statu-
tory construction  generally and to specific  cases  in particular.
In addition,  the Department needs  to recognize  that as  individual
federal prosecutors in its regional offices gain expertise in environmental
law, those  prosecutors  are  entitled to greater  autonomy  in  their work.
The Environmental Crimes Section model presumes a lack of such exper-
tise and, on that basis, centralizes control in Washington, D.C., much to
the chagrin of those in United States Attorneys'  offices.  But the ultimate
success  of the Environmental  Crimes  Section  depends  on  its imparting
environmental  law  expertise  to  those  United  States Attorneys'  offices.
For that reason, when such expertise is obtained, the Section should not
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resist  or  disparage  it, but reward  it  on a  case-by-case,  or  attorney-by-
attorney, basis.
Presently,  for  instance,  there  are  identifiable,  experienced  federal
criminal prosecutors  in the field who  possess considerable  knowledge of
environmental law.  The Section need not abandon altogether its supervi-
sory responsibilities  over the work of those prosecutors, but it can temper
its supervision in recognition of their expertise.  Such recognition would
likely  make  Assistant  United  States  Attorneys  more  willing  to  devote
attention to environmental  cases.  In addition, the lawyers in the Section
could spend less time simply supervising  and more time preparing their
own cases for prosecution.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Environmental law  has assimilated  so poorly  into criminal  law  for
two reasons.  First, policy makers have not yet directly faced the difficult
issues presented by  such an  assimilation, but instead have just assumed
them away by criminalizing  virtually all environmental  violations.  Pol-
icy makers in both the legislative and executive branches  need  to focus
more carefully on the purpose of criminal  law and the design  of environ-
mental laws  in defining the types of conduct warranting  criminal  sanc-
tions.  Moreover,  without  a  shared  definition  of what  constitutes  such
conduct, the current environmental  crimes  controversy  will continue to
plague and hinder effective  enforcement.  More environmental  criminal
enforcement is therefore  needed, but more  than additional resources are
required to make that happen.
Second,  prosecutors  in  leadership  positions lack  expertise  in  both
environmental  and criminal  enforcement  policy.  Assimilation  will only
occur once individual prosecutors gain expertise in both areas of the law.
Only then  can they bridge the gap between  the existing camps  and pro-
mote the development  of settled  criteria for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion  in specific  cases.  They  also  then will  possess the  credibility
necessary  to reduce the adversarial  dialogue  currently  dominating both
within the government and in the government's communication  with the
general public.
These are not easy tasks.  But, then again, little about the evolution
of  environmental  law  and  its  assimilation  during  the  past twenty-five
years has been easy.  The task is instead necessarily  as complex  and in-
tractable as the workings of the natural environment that environmental
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law is itself designed to protect.  Defining environmental crimes and then
establishing an effective criminal enforcement program are no different."
66.  Just as this Essay was going to press, the Department of Justice published  the results of
its internal investigation  of the Environment  Division's Environmental  Crimes Program.  See
CORCORAN  ET AL., supra note 28.  While the report generally "found  no evidence substantiat-
ing the allegations that Justice Department  officials or employees relied on improper criteria in
prosecuting or declining to  prosecute  environmental  crimes  cases,"  id. at 12,  the report did
identify  several  significant  problems-past  and  present-with  the  program.  These  include,
inter alia, (1) a frequent  absence of teamwork  and mutual respect  [within the Environmental
Crimes Program],  which has led to accusations that prosecution decisions have been made on
an improper  basis, id. at 11-12;  (2) the "problem  of distrust"  that has long plagued  relations
between the executive and legislative branches regarding environmental policy, id. at 94-97; (3)
the  failure  of the Environmental  Crimes  Section  to explain  formally  its  reasons  to  decline
prosecution, id. at  115-16; (4) the prior efforts of political  appointees within the Environment
Division to effectuate policy changes by becoming personally involved in individual indictment
decisions  on  an  ad  hoc basis,  which  prompted  questions  of improper political  motivation,
rather than by issuing written policy statements that could have served as a basis for principled
discussion,  id. at  133,  188-92;  (5) "an  unusual level  of emotion  and  acrimony"  within the
Environmental  Crimes Section, id. at 167; see also id at 281; and (6) the absence of coordina-
tion between  EPA and  the Justice Department, id. at 301-02  (describing one  "personal  con-
flict"  which  "led  to  a  highly  adversarial  exchange"  and  thus  "destroyed  the  collegial
atmosphere  that  should  exist  at  such  meetings"  and  "diminished  the  stature  of . . . the
Section").LOYOLA  OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:867